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- Abstract - 
 
Many problems emerge since it is widely believed that high tax rates and ineffective tax 
collection by government are the main causes contributing to the rise of the informal economy. 
Already the economists have established a relationship between tax rates and tax evasion or size of 
the informal economy. The higher is the level of taxation, the greater incentive is to participate in 
informal economic activities and escape taxes. 
At the macroeconomic level, there is a number of so-called indirect methods used to estimate 
the size and dynamics of informal economy, reported in literature as “Monetary Approach”, 
“Implicit Labour Supply Method”, “National Accountancy”, “Energy Consumption Method”, etc. 
Unfortunately, many times there are huge differences among the estimated shares of informal or 
underground economy obtained by various methods. For instance, in case of Romania the figures 
are between about 20% of GDP, obtained on the base of the energy consumption method and more 
than 45% computed by using the monetary approach. Also, the figures reported by the National 
Institute for Statistics (NIS), based on national accounts methodology, increased (mainly due to 
changes in methodology) from about 5% in 1992, to 18% in 1997 and to 20-22% after 2000. 
Adding to these figures about 7% of GDP, representing the estimated level for self-consumption in 
case of a rural household, legal non-registered but informal, resulted that last years the informal 
economy is responsible of 27-29% of national economy. 
In this article, coming from certain general accepted finding of the theory in matter of 
modelling underground economy, we concentrate on evaluating analytically the limit-values of 
certain important parameters involved in models used to estimate the size of underground economy 
and to explain the mechanisms of its dynamics. Then we shall simulate some exercises on available 
data. The second goal of the paper is to report some conclusions of our investigation based on data 
supplied by special surveys organised in Romania. Also, in order to see since certain hypotheses 
(referring to the complex transmission mechanism from the tax policy decisions to the effective 
implication of agents into informal economy) are statistically verified and to extend the study from 
the aggregate level to a deep research inside the population set in regions, we used data supplied 
by this special large survey, which already were processed and are available in our database. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a vast literature concerning the impact of fiscal policy and tax rate on 
macroeconomic stabilisation programs. New developments are recorded regarding this 
subject, from the emergence of supply-side economics. Without ignoring the regulatory 
role of the government budget, the main idea is that the expansion of tax rate over some 
thresholds, continuing to have positive effects on the demand-side and, consequently, on 
the stabilisation process in the short-run, can have negative impact on the supply-side. In 
the long run, the stabilisation process itself will be affected. The general explanation is that 
an increasing tax rate may limit the stimulation of private (capitalistic) firms to investment, 
which is the main factor of development in a free market economic system. 
Despite the fact that there are many complications, at macroeconomic level, induced by 
the structural changes, significant differences between the responses to various taxes, as 
well as by the business cycles and many other factors, however, the mentioned impact was 
demonstrated, at least as a general trend in the long run. Generally accepted the idea that an 
increase of tax rate provokes a migration of activity from the visible sector to the invisible 
sector, the remaining problem is: what is the intensity of the correlation between the tax 
rate level and the proportion of this migration. Moreover, there is the problem of how 
should this intensity change and by what quantity under the impact of other economic 
or/and non-economic factors. To evaluate some essential parameters of this transfer of 
activity (migration), and to produce explanations accepted by standard economics are the 
main goals of the underground economy modelling. 
We are concentrated on some theoretical aspects and on empirical study of the impact 
of various factors on the size and dynamics of informal economy. Coming from the 
existing literature we try to build a simple model in order to estimate the theoretical limit-
values for informal economy based only on a limited number of available macroeconomic 
data, on the one hand. On the other hand, using data from some old surveys on Romanian 
economy, we investigate the behaviour of various groups of households in matter of 
participation in informal activities. Empirical study demonstrated that the main reason of 
informal economy is the general household’s standard of living or more concrete the level 
of actual income obtained by work in formal (official or visible) sector of the economy. 
Then, coming from the regression equations estimated on the available data in two surveys 
organised in Romania in 1996 and 2003, respectively, we tried to extend the model to 
estimate the size and dynamics of informal economy at regional level. In Romania there 
are eight geographic regions for which beginning from few years ago the National Institute 
of Statistics publish in the Territorial Statistics section some essential indicators such as 
total income of main household categories. According to NSI, the regions are as follows: 
1) North - East; 2) South - East; 3) South - Muntenia; 4) South - West Oltenia; 5) West; 
6) North - West; 7) Center; 8) Bucharest - Ilfov.    
 
 
2. Standard theoretical models 
 
There are many studies that approach the psychological effect of the modern State 
development that has been to dig an important gap between the government and the 
citizen. Some authors do not hesitate to see in the underground economy a refuge against 
the will of the State to organise the society, and they affirm that the main “production” of a 
state is the law. Sometimes this production becomes an inside goal. There is a vicious 
cycle, then: the state produces many laws, of which some are not complied with in 
practice, and then the state produces more laws to counteract this practical inefficiency, 
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and then more laws are not complied with in practice, and so on. According to this opinion, 
in order to be optimal a state must produce only those laws that will have a chance to be 
complied with in practice. Each excess-output relating to this optimal level will generate 
inefficiency and perverse effects, as well as increasing of underground economy. By 
describing the attitudes of taxpayers, many reasons can be evoked - coercive nature of 
fiscal policy, lack of identification with the administration, aspects relating to the risk 
behaviour in the case of law infringement detection and the inefficiency of the 
administrative management. 
To describe it in a sentence, the more the fiscal cost is strong; the greater will be the 
desire to avoid paying for each individual reason. This phenomenon has been made evident 
by the Laffer curve, according to which the receipts of the State begin by increasing, and 
then decrease below one certain threshold, as the average taxation rate increases. Gutmann 
has amended the Laffer curve. He thinks that the increase of the rate of taxation 
increasingly incites the individuals to escape the fiscal controls, by penetrating in the 
sphere of the underground activities to the point to distort the Laffer curve (Gutmann, 
1977). According to Gutmann, the Laffer curve must be in fact skewed towards the right 
part of the graph. The weight of the fiscal payments and social contributions, it is to tell the 
obligatory payments, has constantly increased during the last century, and its rate of 
growth is now such that the acceleration is perceptible in a single generation. Generally 
speaking, high taxation rates, few controllers of taxes and relatively weak amend for fiscal 
fraud contribute to persuade the people to take their chance to be undiscovered. On a 
theoretical plan, the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) strengthen this position. The 
problem of taxpayer consists indeed in maximisation of the hoped usefulness of the 
obtained income if he develops a fiscal fraud strategy. 
Consider the model of Allingham and Sandmo where a risk-averse taxpayer is allowed 
to declare less than his actual income, X. Declared or normal income, Xn > 0, is taxed by a 
constant rate, θ > 0, whereas the undeclared income, X - Xn, is taxed, if detected, by a 
higher rate, π. The taxpayer chooses Xn* to maximise his expected utility: 
 
E [ U ] = ( 1 - p ) U ( Y ) + p U ( Z )        (1) 
 
where p is the (exogenously given) probability of detection, and 
 
Y = X - θ Xn            (2) 
Z = X - θ Xn - π ( X - Xn )         (3) 
 
represent his income in the case of detection and non-detection, respectively. The first-
order condition for the maximisation of (1) is 
 
dE [ U ] / dXn = - θ ( 1 - p ) U' ( Y ) + ( π - θ ) p U' ( Z ) = 0    (4) 
 
from which the taxpayer's response to a change in θ may be derived. This is given by 
 
dXn* / dθ = - D -1 (1 - p) U' (Y) {θ Xn [RA (Z) - RA (Y)] - [π / (π - θ)]}  (5) 
 
where D ≡ θ 2 ( 1 - p ) U'' ( Y ) + ( π - θ ) 2 p U'' ( Z ) < 0 is the second-order condition for 
the maximisation of (1) and RA ( I ) = - U" ( I ) / U' ( I ) > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt absolute 
risk-aversion measure, evaluated at I = Y, Z. 
Under decreasing absolute risk-aversion [RA ( Z ) > RA ( Y )], the sign of (5) is 
ambiguous, as asserted by Allingham and Sandmo. However, given that the relative risk-
aversion is constant ( RA ( I ) = c ), implies that 
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dXn* / dθ   > (or <)  0 if cθXn [(Y-Z)/(YZ)] > (or <)  π / (π - θ)     (5’) 
 
or, by substituting (2) and (3) into (5’) and rearranging, that 
 
dXn* / dθ   > (or <)  0 if  c > (or <)  α [1 + β (X/Xn)]                (5’’) 
 
where  α ≡ (X - θXn) / θ(X - Xn) and  β ≡ (1 - π) / (π - θ). Clearly, α > 1, and β > (or <) 0 
if  π > (or <)  1. Hence,  π  ≤  1  ensure that  α(1 + β) > 1, so that  dXn*/dθ  <  0 if  c  ≤ 1  
(notice that c > 1 does not necessarily imply that dXn*/dθ  >  0). However, since β varies 
inversely with π, the stricter the restriction imposed on π, the higher the ceiling on c 
allowed for the satisfaction of  dXn*/dθ  <  0  (recall also the Allingham and Sandmo’s 
result that dXn*/dπ  >  0, so that  X/Xn  rises as π falls). Still, since all that is known on 
X/Xn is that it exceeds unity, the upper bound on c which may safely be identified as 
yielding the desired prediction is just 1+β = (1 - θ) / (π - θ), which rises with θ. Referring 
again to its minimal value, we conclude that if π ≤ 1 and c ≤ 1/π, condition (5’’) surely 
implies that when “the fruits of evasion become sweeter, a rational taxpayer will take a 
bigger bite”. 
If the penalty rate is 100% (i.e. the entire undeclared income is confiscated), a negative 
relationship between declared income and the income tax rate would unambiguously hold 
if the relative risk-aversion coefficient does not exceed unity. In more realistic cases, where 
the penalty rate is lower, the desired prediction will also hold for a higher than unity 
coefficient of relative risk-aversion. For instance, in the U.S., a detected evader is obliged 
to pay less than 1.5 times his evaded taxes for most violations (Pencavel, 1979, p. 122), 
whereas the ratio of tax payments to adjusted gross income averages less than 20% (ibid., 
p. 122). This means that the penalty rate on undeclared income is less than 30%. Hence, if 
the penalty scheme in the U.S. were made dependent on undeclared income, keeping the 
punishment level intact, a negative relationship between declared income and the income 
tax rate would be predicted for a relative risk-aversion coefficient that does not exceed 
3.33. 
Since this work, a sizeable literature applying economic analysis to tax evasion has 
appeared. Many of the theoretical papers on this topic have used models in which a 
representative taxpayer receives income from a single source and then decides how much 
of that income to declare. While such studies reveal much about the behaviour of a single 
underreporting agent, they do not incorporate one important empirical fact about tax 
evasion, namely that the extent to which one evades taxes is strongly correlated with the 
source of one's income (Clotfelter, 1983). 
In the recent years, several theoretical papers have recognised that opportunities for 
evasion differ among occupations. Such papers have also emphasised that these differences 
may affect an agent's labour market behaviour. An agent may, in other words, base his 
labour supply decisions in part on the ability to evade taxes. Theoretical models that 
recognise tax evasion to be easier when income is received from certain sources (self-
employment, for instance) rather than other sources (corporate employment, more 
frequently) typically assume that the economy has two sectors: one in which evasion is 
impossible, presumably because of tax holding and information reporting, and another in 
which evasion is possible. Such papers are often referred to as studies of the underground 
economy. 
Generally, the models focused on the situation of the underground economy in Western 
countries. Coming from the fundamental tension in the applied literature, which refers to 
the interpretation of labour force in the underground sector, Gibson and Kelley (1994) 
developed a theoretical model that, beside the general problems of underground economy, 
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focused on the case of informal sector in the developing countries. An important 
conclusion derived from their model is that the costs in the informal sector must be greater 
than in formal sector. Then, if the informal sector uses more resources per unit of output, 
the social surplus will expand as the formal sector replaces the informal sector. The 
outcome, however, depends upon the existing distribution of income, which further 
complicates matters. 
In case of Romania in transition period, we mention the methodology we used (Albu et 
al., 1998) in order to estimate the impact of underground sector to the general dynamics of 
economy, and the relation between underground economy and institutional development 
(Daianu and Albu, 1997). Some studies seem to confirm the hypothesis of Laffer's curve 
model (Lemieux et al., 1994), but other authors contest the availability of this model at 
least at macroeconomic level (Pestieau, 1989). A detailed study on the Laffer’s curve 
model and its implications on the fiscal policy plan can be find in our work achieved in 
1995 within CEPREMAP (Albu, 1995).  
Also, in literature there are a number of other models trying to estimate the size of 
underground economy and to simulate its formatting mechanisms. One of them is the 
model based on the so-called monetary approach, but which generally produced some not 
very robust estimation and was many times contested by economists (see Isachsen and 
Strom, 1985, for the case of Norway, and French et al., 1999, for the Romanian economy). 
Also, we used two generalised models based on the so-called labour force supply approach 
and the allocation of working time fund approach, respectively. Unfortunately, due to some 
poor adequate statistical data it is possible to simulate these models on Romanian economy 
in the period of transition only as an exercise. 
 
 
3. New hypotheses and estimation models 
 
Now, we are concentrating on developing the previous theoretic model of tax evasion in 
order to estimate underground economy bases on usually available macroeconomic data. 
Thus, we consider that at macroeconomic or aggregated level the behaviour of taxpayer is 
conforming to some supplementary hypotheses, expressed by the following equations. To 
facilitate understanding, they are grouped in a number of sub-models. Then, the sub-
models will be assembled within a model that takes into account the impact of the penalty 
tax. This type of tax is applied when the fiscal authorities discover subtractions from tax 
pay duties or illegal activities. It is as a rule higher than the so-called normal tax rate, but 
smaller than 1 (the case corresponding to the confiscation of the entire non-declared 
income by the fiscal authorities). 
 Sub-model S1 
In order to capture the impact of a penalty tax rate on the yearly average tax rate, we 
consider a Laffer's curve model. Thus, we consider two conventional stages of the tax 
collecting process. 
The first stage is referring to the normally paid taxes that are collected from taxpayers. 
To express the total amount of taxes received by fiscal authorities in this stage we recall 
the simple expression of a standard Laffer's curve model: 
 
Xn (θ)  =  ( 1 - θ ) X         (6) 
Xa (θ)  =  θ X          (7) 
Tn (θ)  = θ Xn  =  θ ( 1 - θ ) X       (8) 
Yn (θ)  =  ( 1 - θ ) Xn  =  ( 1 - θ ) 2  X        (9) 
YI (θ)  =  X  -  Tn  =  ( 1 - θ + θ 2 ) X                 (10) 
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 where Xn is the declared income,  θ - average value of normal tax rate, X – total actual 
income or total GDP (declared and non-declared), Xa – undeclared income or hidden GDP 
at the end of normal tax procedure, Tn – total amount of taxes received by normal 
procedures, Yn – the remaining disposable income from declared income after its normal 
taxation, and YI – total remaining disposable private income (households and private 
sector) in case of first stage with no penalty procedure (the entire initially hidden income, 
Xa, remains non-discovered, and consequently YI=Yn+Xa). A graphical representation can 
be found in Figure 1, where the indicators are reported as percentage of total income or 
GDP, X. 
 Sub-model S2
In case of considering the second stage, the fiscal authorities discover a part of the 
initially hidden activity, which now became visible, and by applying penalty procedures 
they gather supplementary income for the public budget, as follows: 
 
Xd (p)  =  p Xa                   (11) 
Xi (p)   =  ( 1 - p ) Xa                   (12) 
Td (p)   =  π Xd  =  π p Xa                    (13) 
Yd (p)  =  ( 1 - π ) Xd  =  p ( 1 - π ) Xa                  (14) 
 
where Xd is the detected part of the initially non-declared income, p – average probability 
of detection, Xi – total actual income finally non-detected or invisible GDP (non-declared 
and non-detected), Td – total amount of taxes received by penalty procedures, π – average 
of penalty tax rate,  and Yd – the remaining disposable income from discovered income 
after penalty taxation. A graphical representation can be found in Figure 2, where the 
indicators are reported as percentage of total initially hidden income or GDP, Xa. 
 
0 0.5 1
0
50
100 X
Xn θi
Xa θi
Tn θi
Yn θi
YI θi
1
θi
 
Figure 1. The behaviour of the system under the hypotheses of Sub-model S1  
 
 
 Sub-model S3
The main hypothesis of this model is that the probability of detection, p, depends 
positively both on the initially hidden economy size and on the total amount of taxes 
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finally collected by the state (i.e., the probability of detection becomes endogenous), 
expressed as shares in total actual income or GDP, as follows: 
 
p (xa,t)  =  xa t                   (15) 
xa  =  Xa / X = θ                   (16) 
t    =  T / X  = ( Tn  +  Td ) / X  =  θ ( 1 - θ )  +  π p θ               (17) 
 
where T = Tn + Td. 
The probability of detection increases when the share of underground (hidden) economy 
becomes larger (the so-called omnipresence of informal economy). On the other hand, it is 
increasing when the share of total collected taxes, t, in GDP is growing (the so-called 
omnipresence of the state’s power). 
Based on relations (15)-(17), after some algebraic operations, the probability of 
detection can be written as following: 
 
p(θ)  =  [ θ 2 ( 1 - θ ) ] / ( 1 -  π θ 2 ) =  [ θ 2  ( 1 - θ ) ] / ( 1 - k θ 3 )            (18) 
 
where k is the coefficient of multiplying the normal taxation rate, θ,  
 
and  π  =  k θ                    (18’) 
 
0 0.5 1
0
50
100 Xa
Xd pj
Xi pj
Td pj
Yd pj
1
pj  
Figure 2. The behaviour of the system under the hypotheses of Sub-model S2 
 
 
Taking into account that the maximum level of penalty rate, π, is 100% (i.e., the entire 
discovered income is confiscated), in case of a given level of θ, the maximum level of 
coefficient k will be equal to 1/θ (its minimum level is indeed 1, i.e. π = θ). So, the domain 
in which the probability of detection, p, could be placed is delimited by the lines pmin(θ) = 
[ θ2 (1-θ)] / (1-kmin θ3) and pmax(θ) = [θ2 (1-θ)] / (1-kmax θ3), as it is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The probability function under the hypotheses of Sub-model S3 
 
 
The general model 
Combining the three above-mentioned sub-models a general model, which can be 
described by the following set of equations, resulted. Thus, based on the behaviour of 
taxpayers, the national income or GDP is divided in three fundamental parts: Xn – declared 
income, Xd – undeclared income, but then discovered by authorities, and Xi – undeclared 
income, but then continuing to remain undiscovered by authorities. The latter is called 
“invisible sector” in order to make difference from the “visible sector”, which comprises 
two parts (Xv = Xn + Xd). The official published statistical data are usually referring only 
to the visible sector. Thus, the yearly or quarterly published GDP means in fact only Xv. 
 
1) Distribution of total income among sectors: 
 
X  =  Xn + Xa  =  Xn + Xd + Xi  =  Xv + Xi                (19) 
 
where Xn = xnX = (1-θ)X; Xa = θX; Xd = pXa = θpX; Xi = θ(1-p)X; Xv = (1-θ+θp)X. 
 
2) Distribution of income within sectors: 
 
Xn  =  Tn + Yn  =  θ Xn  +  ( 1 - θ ) Xn                (20) 
Xd  =  Td + Yd  =  π Xd  +  ( 1 - π ) Xd                (21) 
Xi  =  Yi                    (22) 
 
3) Distribution of total income by destinations: 
 
X  =  T + Y                    (23) 
 
where  
 
T = Tn + Td = θ Xn + π Xd = θ ( 1 - θ ) X + θ π p X = θ ( 1 - θ + π p ) X            (24) 
Y = Yn + Yd + Yi = ( 1 - θ ) Xn + θ p ( 1 - π ) X + θ ( 1 - p ) X             (25) 
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The economic system described by the general model demonstrates a very complicated 
dynamics, essentially varying with parameters as θ and π or, by extension, with k and p. 
One conclusion is that the economic policy and its tools can be oriented either to the 
fiscal pressure side (i.e., θ) or to the improvement of the penalty side (i.e., π). However, 
to find an optimal solution between the two sides of policy continues to be an unsolved 
problem, at least in the case of applied policy. Such complicated dynamics is in a way 
similar to that deduced from the Allingham and Sandmo model. 
In the next section, focusing on obtaining a procedure to evaluate the limits between 
which the underground economy could be framed, many times we shall use implicitly the 
so-called computer assisted proofs instead of rigorous proofs. Concerning latter, we feel 
that most economists will not be interested in the means and often very technical details; 
therefore we sometimes just give sketches.     
 
 
4. Estimating the limit-values of the underground economy size 
 
Usually, at macroeconomic level, the available statistical data are only the following 
aggregated indicators: Xv – total visible income or reported GDP, T – total revenues 
collected from people and economic agents (there are included here mainly those coming 
from the state budget, local budgets, and state social insurance budget), and eventually Td 
– total amount of taxes collected by penalty procedures, in case of detection (in case of 
Romania, here there are included: “Tax on profit from illegal commercial activities or 
against Law on the consumer protection”, “Delay increases and penalties for term unpaid 
revenues”, “Judicial fines”, etc.).  
Considering the case when only statistical data series of Xv and T are available, in the 
context of our model it is useful to recall the following two fundamental relations: T = θ(1-
θ+pπ)X, and Xv = (1-θ+θp)X, respectively. They permit to calculate the statistical 
reported tax rate (tst), as follows: 
 
tst  =  T / Xv  =  [ θ ( 1 - θ + p π ) ] / [ ( 1 - θ + θ p ) ]              (26) 
 
Now, replacing p and π by their definitions (relations (18) and respectively (18’)), the 
actually tax rate can be written as follows: 
 
tst (θ, k)  =  θ / [ 1 - θ 3 ( k – 1 ) ],  with  0 < tst < 1              (27) 
 
Also, we can write the reverse relation of k, as follows: 
 
k (θ, tst)  =  1 + { ( 1 / θ 2 ) [ ( 1 / θ ) - ( 1 / tst ) ] }               (28) 
 
with θ < tst and kmax = 1/θ. 
 
Taking into account that tst could theoretically be placed within the interval [0; 1] and k 
within [1; 1/θ], now we can calculate the new form of kmax as a function of θ, as follows: 
 
kmax (θ)  =  [ 1 - θ ( 1 - θ 2 ) ] / ( θ 3 )                 (29) 
 
The most important result obtained was coming from the two theoretic limits of k: a 
very restrained interval of values in which could be placed the variable θ. Thus, in the case 
of our model (where θ is only theoretically between 0 and 1), the maximum level of θ is in 
the case of zero detection θmax = tst, and its minimum level, respectively, is given by only 
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one solution (having economic significance) of the three solutions of the following 
equation: 
 
tst θ 3  -  tst θ 2  -  θ  +  tst  =  0                 (30) 
 
The analytical expression of this remarkable value of θ, noted as “θ1”, was obtained by 
using the so-called computer assistance (here, because its formula is too large to be 
presented it was omitted).  
Now, the main equations that are describing the economic system behaviour and may be 
used to build up an efficient econometric strategy can be expressed as follows: 
 
test  =  [ ( 1 - θ ) tst ] / ( 1 - θ 2 tst )                   (31) 
xvest  =  ( 1 - θ ) / ( 1 - θ 2 tst )                   (32) 
pest  =  [ ( 1 - θ ) θ tst ] / ( 1 - θ 2 tst )                 (33)  
         
where test is the best estimator of t=T/X, xvest – the best estimator of xv=Xv/X, pest – the 
best estimator of p=Xd/Xa, and 
 
θ  ∈ [ θ1(tst), tst ]                   (34) 
 
Alternatively, we should consider also a simplified variant for the probability of detection 
definition to replace relation (15), as follows: 
 
p (xa)  =  xa                    (15’) 
 
In this case, again the resulted maximum level of θ (obtained by making π=θ in the relation 
of definition for tst) is equal to tst, but its minimum level (obtained by making π=1 in the 
relation of definition for tst) will be as follows: 
 
θ2 (tst)  =  [(1+tst) - (1 + 2 tst - 3 tst2)1/2] / (2 tst)                (35) 
 
and 
 
θ  ∈ [ θ2(tst), tst ]         (34’) 
 
A graphical representation of the area within which parameter θ is forced to vary in the 
two cases can be found in Figure 4. The two variation areas of θ are between the solid line, 
tst, and θ1 (doted line) and between the solid line, tst, and θ2 (dashed line) respectively. 
Figure 5 presents the behaviour of t and xv, as function of tst and respectively θ in case of 
using θ1 parameter (here, tsti are the i values of tst and θi j are the ij values of θ; but θ1(tsti) 
< θ i j < tsti, where i = 1, 2,…, 40  and  j = 1, 2, …, 20). Figure 6 presents the behaviour of t 
and xv, as function of tst and respectively θ in case of using θ2 parameter (here, tsti are the 
i values of tst and θi j are the ij values of θ; but θ2(tsti) < θ i j < tsti, where i = 1, 2,…, 40  
and  j = 1, 2, …, 20). 
In order to apply the model to the Romanian economy for 1989-2004, we used 
statistical data from National Accounts. Also, as a measure of overall tax ratio we 
considered, according to the OECD methodology (Blades, 1922; Schneider, 2002), the 
fiscal ratio together with the social ratio. Estimated values for certain indicators obtained 
by using θ2 parameter are presented in Table 1. 
Despite the model makes more complex the variation map of certain factors involved in 
explaining the mechanism of stimulating people to participate in informal activities, many 
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others remain unknown at regional level. Thus, aside to the tax rate other candidates to 
explain the complex process of underground sector development seem to be the 
productivity level expected in this sector (and further specific level of wages), level of 
income obtained in visible sector, etc. 
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Figure 4. The restricted variation areas for parameter θ: θ∈[θ1(tst), tst] and 
θ∈[θ2(tst), tst] respectively 
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Figure 5. The behaviour of t and xv, as function of tst and θ for θ1 < θ < tst 
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Figure 6. The behaviour of t and xv, as function of tst and θ for θ2 < θ < tst 
 
 
Table 1. Main indicators expressing the informal economy extension in Romania 
- as % of X (total GDP) - 
 tst xv xi xn xa t y 
1989 35.9 67.2-73.6 26.4-32.8 64.1-71.4 28.6-35.9 24.1-26.4 73.6-75.9 
1990 35.2 67.8-74.0 26.0-32.2 64.8-71.9 28.1-35.2 23.8-26.0 74.0-76.2 
1991 34.0 68.7-74.6 25.4-31.3 66.0-72.7 27.3-34.0 23.4-25.4 74.6-76.6 
1992 31.4 70.8-76.1 23.9-29.2 68.6-74.6 25.4-31.4 22.2-23.9 76.1-77.8 
1993 28.5 73.2-77.8 22.2-26.8 71.5-76.6 23.4-28.5 20.9-22.2 77.8-79.1 
1994 28.7 73.0-77.7 22.3-27.0 71.3-76.5 23.5-28.7 21.0-22.3 77.7-79.0 
1995 26.9 74.6-78.8 21.2-25.4 73.1-77.8 22.2-26.9 20.1-21.2 78.8-79.9 
1996 26.5 74.9-79.1 20.9-25.1 73.5-78.0 22.0-26.5 19.8-20.9 79.1-80.2 
1997 28.0 73.6-78.1 21.9-26.4 72.0-77.0 23.0-28.0 20.6-21.9 78.1-79.4 
1998 30.4 71.6-76.7 23.3-28.4 69.6-75.3 24.7-30.4 21.8-23.3 76.7-78.2 
1999 32.5 69.9-75.5 24.5-30.1 67.5-73.8 26.2-32.5 22.7-24.5 75.5-77.3 
2000 35.0 67.9-74.1 25.9-32.1 65.0-72.0 28.0-35.0 23.8-25.9 74.1-76.2 
2001 28.4 73.3-77.9 22.1-26.7 71.6-76.7 23.3-28.4 20.8-22.1 77.9-79.2 
2002 28.3 73.4-77.9 22.1-26.6 71.7-76.7 23.3-28.3 20.8-22.1 77.9-79.2 
2003 27.5 74.0-78.4 21.6-26.0 72.5-77.3 22.7-27.5 20.4-21.6 78.4-79.6 
2004 27.3 74.2-78.6 21.4-25.8 72.7-77.5 22.5-27.3 20.3-21.4 78.6-79.7 
 
 
5. Estimating the informal economy at regional level 
 
As empirical studies based on surveys demonstrate, one of the most significant 
determinants of participation in informal activities is the average income per person in 
household obtained in formal sector. Moreover, we should consider many other factors as 
stimulating households to involve in the informal sector, such as occupation, region, age, 
education, etc., as we proceeded in some old studies (Duchene et al., 1998; Albu et al., 
2002a and 2002b; Albu and Nicolae, 2002). Based on such special organised surveys 
certain useful conclusions could be outlined: 1) People in households perceive the high rate 
 12 
of taxation as the main cause of the underground activity (more than 80% of answers in 
surveys demonstrate this idea); 2) Separating the main motivations of operating in informal 
sector in two groups – “subsistence” and “enterprise”, respectively, the data in surveys 
suggest that the subsistence represented a relevant reason for the households’ decision to 
operate in the informal sector; 3) Informal activities supply a “safety valve” within the 
surviving strategies adopted by the poorest households; 4) Participation in the informal 
sector seems to not be simply correlated with poverty: in the informal activities are 
involved poor people (having probably low level of education), but also relatively rich 
persons. However, their motivations are quite different. The former are practically “forced” 
to operate in informal sector (the “subsistence” criterion), but the latter are “invited” to 
participate in it (the “enterprise” criterion). In both cases, at least during the first stages of 
transition to a free market system in Romania, the environment was propitious due to 
legislative incoherence, feeble penalty system in the cases of fraudulent activities, and 
existence of some accompanying elements of proper informal activity, such as corruption, 
bureaucracy, etc. Moreover, the behaviour related to the informal economy is sometimes 
fundamentally different between the two groups of population. The most synthetic 
expression of this idea could be as follows: along with their formal income growth, the 
households tend to wish to obtain more and more informal income in absolute terms, but in 
the same time its share in the total income tends to decrease (sharply down until a 
reasonable average level of formal income is obtained and slowly down in the case of the 
richest households). Probably, the main reason for which the rich people could be involved 
in the informal sector is provided by the attempt to avoid taxes and to follow an optimising 
strategy in this matter. 
Based on database resulted from two special surveys organised in Romania (1996 and 
2003, respectively) permitted us to estimated the parameters for the correlation between 
formal income in household and its participation in informal activities. Omitting other 
details regarding the complicate methodologies and procedures that we used to obtain a set 
of data on informal income in households, we report here only the final results and the 
strategy that we use now in order to extent them from households’ population in survey to 
the entire population at regional and national levels. 
Certain behavioural regimes were outlined in matter of potential implication in informal 
sector. Thus, in the case of poor households (obtaining relative low income from their 
formal activity) there is a large availability to work in the informal sector. On the other 
hand, in the case of rich households (obtaining relative large income from their work in the 
formal sector), their availability for informal jobs becomes smaller; however still remain 
temptation for the richest people to accept informal jobs in order to supplement their 
income or, perhaps, to avoid taxation. Despite general decreasing trend of the share of 
desired informal income along with the growth of the basic formal income of household, in 
absolute terms the desired informal income has an ascending trend. 
In similar way to the case of desired informal income, we used the hypothesis of a 
hyperbolic-type function for z%(v). This time z means the effective informal income, 
being different from the desired informal income. Thus, in order to estimate the 
coefficients we selected as basic regression equation that expressing the share of informal 
income in the total household’s income, z%, as being correlated with the level of the actual 
formal income, v, in household, as follows: 
 
z% = a / (v + b) + (1 - a/b) + u       (36) 
 
where a, b are coefficients to be estimated and u is residual variance. 
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Then, using the estimated values of coefficients we can write, along with changes in the 
level of formal income, the expected trajectories, as follows (see for details, Albu, 2004): 
 
ze% = a / (v + b) + (1 - a/b)        (36’) 
 
ze(v) = [(b – a) / a] . v + (b2 / a), with ze(0) = (b2/a)     (37) 
 
In order to estimate the real level for informal income, according to the available data 
from survey of 1996, we used two sub-samples, noted as A and B. In the case of the 
sample A the function of informal income share reflects indirectly the impact of changing 
the proportion of households operating in the informal sector (or, equivalently: the impact 
of changing the probability that a household is involved in the informal sector) along with 
the growth of the formal income per person in household. Consequently, it could be used 
directly to expand the estimation procedure to the regional and national levels. An 
impediment remains: it is implicitly supposed the same distribution of the entire population 
by formal income as in the case of the A sample. On the other hand, within sample A there 
is the sub-sample B comprising only the households obtaining informal income. In this 
case, to simply extrapolate the z%(v) function to the entire set of households’ population is 
not a good solution (it is the case of the so-called hypothesis of a generalized informal 
economy). Thus, we have to amend the z%(v) function by multiplying it with the 
probability function computed by deciles of formal income. 
As a first step, we amended the last estimating equation by adding a supplementary 
equation concerning the probability that a person in a household is involved in the informal 
economy. This was estimated by regressing within the sample A the proportion of persons 
in households obtaining effectively informal income in the total number of deciles of 
formal income in which they are located (the total number of this special category of 
household is just the sub-sample B): 
 
p = a . d  +  b  + u         (38) 
 
and from which the equation (38) was rewritten as 
 
zpe(v) = ze(v) . pe(d)         (39) 
 
where d are deciles (d=1…10); pe(d)=ad+b is the estimation equation of the probability 
that a person in a household is involved in the informal economy, p; a and b are the 
estimated coefficients, and u is residual variance in the equation (38). The estimation 
procedure (39) is noted as C. 
Then, we extended the three estimation procedures, A, B, and C to the regional and 
national level over the period 2000-2005. In order to conserve estimated values for 
coefficients in case of extending the model to the regional and national level, all data were 
expressed in constant prices of September 1996 (as in the original data of the 1996 survey).  
Synthetically, the conclusion is that over the period 2000-2005 the informal income 
decreased in Romania from 22.3-22.8% in the total income of households to 17.2-18.3%, 
as we can see in Table 2. Under the very improbable hypothesis of a generalised 
participation in informal activities (in theoretical case when all household are involved in 
informal activities, as in case of the sub-sample B), the computed share decreased from 
33.6% in 2000 to 27.9% in 2005. The main factor of this favourable dynamics of informal 
income was the formal income growth (+42%, from about 158300 to 225600 
Lei/person/month, computed in September 1996 prices).  
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More interesting conclusions could be extracted in the case of analysing by regions the 
dynamic process of involvement in the informal sector. In Appendix 1 are presented the 
three matrixes comprising the shares of informal income within the total income in the case 
of the eight regions of Romania for each year of the period 2000-2005, corresponding to 
the three estimating methods. In Appendix 2 is presented the contribution of regions to the 
total informal income at national level, also corresponding to the three methods. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the estimated dynamics of the average share of informal income 
in total income at the national level, based on the two estimation procedures, A and C, over 
the period 2000-2005 (the year 2000 is denoted as 0 and 2005 as 5), and its relatively 
strong inverse correlation with the distribution of formal income grouped by regions, 
respectively (regions are noted as i=1…8, and years as j=0…5). z%M represents the yearly 
average share of the informal income in the total income at national level, resulted from the 
regression equation based on the procedure A (sample A) and zp%M from that based on 
the procedure C (applying the regression equation on sub-sample B amended by the 
probability function), respectively. 
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Figure 7.      Figure 8. 
 
 
Table 2. Average shares of informal income in the total income of households  
over the period 2000-2005
Years z%M zp%M 
2000 22.3 22.8 
2001 21.2 21.7 
2002 20.7 21.3 
2003 19.6 20.4 
2004 17.6 18.6 
2005 17.2 18.3 
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Appendix 1 
 
Shares of informal income in total income by regions 
 
H1 Estimations under the hypotheses of procedure A  
(regression equation on sample A) 
 
Years   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Regions R1 0.235 0.233 0.228 0.214 0.187 0.188  
R2 0.222 0.215 0.212 0.202 0.191 0.185  
R3 0.232 0.221 0.222 0.205 0.188 0.184 
R4 0.215 0.209 0.215 0.205 0.184 0.182  
R5 0.219 0.205 0.201 0.192 0.168 0.167  
R6 0.226 0.210 0.201 0.192 0.169 0.171  
R7 0.220 0.206 0.199 0.188 0.171 0.166  
R8 0.206 0.184 0.169 0.163 0.145 0.134  
  Average 0.223 0.212 0.207 0.196 0.176 0.172  
 
 
H2 Estimations under the hypotheses of procedure C  
(regression equation on sub-sample B amended by the regression  
equation of probability sub-sample B in sample A) 
 
Years   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Regions R1 0.267 0.265 0.260 0.246 0.221 0.222  
R2 0.246 0.239 0.237 0.228 0.217 0.212  
R3 0.247 0.236 0.237 0.222 0.207 0.204  
R4 0.222 0.217 0.222 0.214 0.195 0.193  
R5 0.217 0.205 0.201 0.194 0.174 0.173  
R6 0.213 0.200 0.193 0.185 0.167 0.168  
R7 0.199 0.188 0.182 0.173 0.160 0.156  
R8 0.179 0.162 0.151 0.147 0.133 0.125  
  Average 0.228 0.217 0.213 0.204 0.186 0.183  
 
 
H3 Estimations under the hypothesis of procedure B  
(a generalized informal economy based on the equation of regression  
used in case of sub-sample B) 
 
Years   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Regions R1 0.349 0.347 0.342 0.326 0.296 0.297 
R2 0.336 0.327 0.324 0.313 0.300 0.294  
R3 0.347 0.334 0.335 0.317 0.297 0.293  
R4 0.327 0.321 0.327 0.317 0.293 0.290  
R5 0.332 0.316 0.311 0.302 0.274 0.273  
R6 0.339 0.321 0.312 0.301 0.275 0.277  
R7 0.333 0.317 0.309 0.297 0.278 0.272  
R8 0.317 0.292 0.275 0.269 0.247 0.234  
  Average 0.336 0.324 0.318 0.306 0.283 0.279  
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Appendix 2 
 
Shares of informal income in total income by years 
 
H1 Estimations under the hypotheses of procedure A  
(regression equation on sample A) 
 
Years   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Regions R1 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.171 0.171 0.171  
R2 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.130 0.130  
R3 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.153 0.153  
R4 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.106 0.106  
R5 0.091 0.091 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090  
R6 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127  
R7 0.118 0.118 0.117 0.118 0.118 0.118  
R8 0.103 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.106  
  Total  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
 
 
H2 Estimations under the hypotheses of procedure C  
(regression equation on sub-sample B amended by the regression  
equation of probability sub-sample B in sample A) 
 
Years   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Regions R1 0.196 0.194 0.194 0.195 0.197 0.196  
R2 0.146 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.143 0.143  
R3 0.162 0.162 0.161 0.162 0.16 0.160  
R4 0.109 0.108 0.107 0.107 0.106 0.106  
R5 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.087 0.087  
R6 0.115 0.115 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.116  
R7 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.102  
R8 0.084 0.086 0.087 0.087 0.089 0.091 
  Total  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
 
 
H3 Estimations under the hypothesis of procedure B  
(a generalized informal economy based on the equation of regression  
used in case of sub-sample B) 
 
Years   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  
Regions R1 0.168 0.167 0.167 0.168 0.169 0.168   
   R2 0.131 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.128 0.128  
R3 0.153 0.152 0.152 0.152 0.151 0.150  
R4 0.108 0.107 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.105  
R5 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.090 0.091 0.090  
R6 0.126 0.127 0.128 0.127 0.128 0.127  
R7 0.118 0.119 0.118 0.119 0.118 0.119  
R8 0.104 0.106 0.109 0.108 0.110 0.113  
  Total  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
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